A Primer on Blogging

IDENTIFYING LEGAL ISSUES FOR YOU AND YOUR CLIENT
By: R. Johan Conrod, Jr., Esq.*


I. INTRODUCTION

The internet version of a daily journal, blogs have exploded in number over the past few years. These online diaries range from the mundane to the extraordinary, and in many cases they have provided access to material never before communicated to a wide audience – including blogs from persons as diverse as researchers at the South Pole and American soldiers in Iraq. In fact, this author’s brother keeps family and friends updated via a blog on daily life in the jungles of Cameroon, Africa, where he and his family live with an indigenous tribal group.

For lawyers, blogging creates its own niche of legal questions. In the intellectual property field, bloggers have faced lawsuits for alleged copyright violations and have faced the risk of liability for trademark infringement. In the First Amendment arena, those questions have arisen in the defamation context and in several instances where bloggers have attempted to avail themselves of privileges traditionally afforded to more traditional journalists. Employees who blog have encountered, in some instances, stiff resistance – and even termination – from their employers. And employers whose employees blog must determine the rules governing this new sphere.

This outline traces some of the major issues facing bloggers and those impacted by blogging, either as intellectual property owners, defamation plaintiffs or employers. It provides citations to authorities and commentators addressing these unique matters. As with blogs themselves, however, it is merely a snapshot of the law at this moment in time. Practitioners should be sure to update these materials when faced with future disputes, as the law is in a constant state of evolution.

II. BLOGS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

A. Copyright Protection

1. General Rules

(a) In general, copyrighted material enjoys the same protections on the internet as elsewhere. See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Software Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (addressing copyright claim involving material published on the internet). Thus, if a blogger uses copyrighted material on his blog he can face liability just as if the material had been printed without authorization in a book. Id.

(b) Moreover, traditional defenses to copyright also apply. Id.

(c) In particular, several recent decisions have addressed the applicability of the “fair use” defense to claims of infringement for copyrighted material posted on the internet. The fair use defense is contained in section 107 of the Copyright Act and provides as follows:
… the fair use of a copyrighted work, … for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

17 U.S.C. § 107. The fair use doctrine “permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.” Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th Circuit, 1997).

(c) For example, the decision in Kelly involved Arriba Software’s decision to operate an internet search engine that displayed its results in the form of small pictures rather than text alone. Kelly, a professional photographer, sued Arriba, arguing that its use of thumbnail images of his photos infringed. The court found that Arriba’s use of the images constituted fair use. In particular it found that the use of Kelly’s images was not highly exploitative and that Arriba’s use of the images as thumbnail size, instead of full size, was transformative.

(d) The court in Field v Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006), also upheld a defense of fair use against claims of copyright infringement. There, Field argued that Google violated Field’s exclusive rights to reproduce copies of his works by allowing internet users to access copies of his work stored by Google in an online repository. The court held that in offering access to copyrighted works through “cached” links Google served “different and socially important purposes.” The court held that Google’s activity was thus transformative. The court also noted that Field published his work on his own websites, which made his work available for free to the world. See also Note, Mollie E. Nolan, “Search for Original Expression: Fan Fiction and the Fair Use Defense,” 30 S. Ill. U. L.J. 533 (2005-06).

(e) Finally, the matter of X17, Inc. v. Mario Lavandeira, dba Perez Hilton, Case No. CV 06-7608-VBF-JC (C.D. Cal., Apr. 23, 2007), is currently pending in a California court and may have significant impact on the blogging world, at least for those bloggers who engage in social commentary. There, celebrity blogger Perez Hilton has been sued by X17 because he routinely posted X17’s copyrighted celebrity paparazzi photos on his blog, www.perezhilton.com. Hilton’s attorneys claim ‘fair use’ because Perez ‘transforms’ and comments on the photos for satirical purposes, and does not sell them (in other words, Perez handwrites sarcastic blurbs on photos of celebrities and then posts the pictures on his site with accompanying, similarly sarcastic, commentary). The court recently denied X17’s motion for a preliminary injunction, but did so based on X17’s failure to properly support the motion with admissible evidence rather than any substantive copyright law. See also Robin Abcarian, Perez Hilton takes their best shots, L.A. Times, December 17, 2006 (discussing the suit and accompanying controversy).

2. Provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Relevant to Bloggers.

(a) Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) may be particularly relevant to bloggers. The DMCA creates a ‘safe harbor’ for internet service providers (ISP’s) to ‘respond expeditiously’ to notices claiming that they are hosting or linking to copyright infringing material. If a blogger receives a ‘take down’ notice, and the blogger believes the material does not infringe copyright, the blogger can ‘counter notify’ the ISP and the ISP can retain its immunity from liability.

(b) Section 512(c)(3) provides specific rules for infringement notices and section 512(g)(3) covers counter notification.

(c) Some commentators have argued that the immunity for service providers can extend to copyrighted material posted on a blog’s ‘comment’ section and thus the same procedure for notification would apply.

(d) Section 512(h) of the DMCA contains a specific provision allowing a copyright holder to subpoena an ISP for identification of an alleged infringer who is posting anonymously. See also Note, Jeffrey M. Levinsohn, “Protecting Copyright at the Expense of Internet Anonymity: The Constitutionality of Forced Identity Disclosure under § 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,” 23 Temple Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 243 (2004).

3. Other Copyright Issues

(a) Other issues that may be increasingly litigated in the future include the extent to which hyperlinks can be copyrighted. So far, the courts have generally concluded that ‘deep links’ (links to pages other than a website’s home page) are not copyright protected. Ticketmaster v Tickets.com, No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL 21406289 (C.D. Cal., March 6, 2003). See also Comment, Michael Dockins, “Internet Links: The Good, The Bad, The Tortious, and a Two-Part Test,” 36 U. Tol. L. Rev. 367 (2004-05).

B. Trademarks

1. General Rules

(a) Per 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125, a plaintiff alleging causes of action for trademark infringement and unfair competition must prove (1) that it possesses a mark; (2) that the defendant used the mark; (3) that the defendant's use of the mark occurred "in commerce"; (4) that the defendant used the mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services; and (5) that the defendant used the mark in a manner likely to confuse consumers.

2. Courts Find Violations Where the Use is Misleading.

(a) The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently addressed these provisions in the Internet context. In People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001), Doughney registered the domain name PETA.org and created a website called “People Eating Tasty Animals.” The Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of PETA and observed the following:

“prospective users of a plaintiffs' services who mistakenly access a defendants' web site may fail to continue to search for plaintiffs' web site due to confusion or frustration. Such users, who are presumably looking for the services provided by the plaintiffs on their web site, may instead opt to select hyperlinks contained in defendants' web site. Thus, a defendants' action in appropriating plaintiff's mark has a connection to plaintiffs' distribution of its services over the Internet.”[1]

3. Courts Protect Non-Misleading Uses.

(a) By contrast, courts have found that non-misleading use of trademarks in URLs and domain names of critical websites is not trademark infringement. Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (2002)) (observing that trademark rights do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use of the mark by another who is communicating ideas or expressing points of view).

III. BLOGS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

A. Defamation

1. General Rules

a) To be actionable under Virginia law, a defamatory statement must be false, and it must be a statement of fact, not opinion. Wiest v. E-Fense, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 604 (E.D. Va. 2005). Persons who republish the defamatory statement are generally subject to the same liability as the originator of the statement. Id.

(b) Courts have applied the same standard regardless of whether the statement is published on paper or the internet. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). See also Comment, Melissa A. Troiano, “The New Journalism? Why Traditional Defamation Laws Should Apply to Internet Blogs,” 55 Am. U. Law Rev. 1447 (2005-06).

(c) In New York Times v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court established the rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with “actual malice” – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for the truth of the statement. Id. at 279-80.

(d) Generally, even private plaintiffs must prove that a media defendant acted with some degree of fault when publishing false statements about a matter of public concern. See generally Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

2. Courts Addressing Defamation Online.

(a) Courts have issued dozens of decisions involving defamation claims in the internet, email or online bulletin board context. See generally Annotation, Carolyn Kelly MacWilliam, “Individual and Corporate Liability for Libel and Slander in Electronic Communications, Including E-mail, Internet and Websites,” 3 A.L.R. 6th 153 (West 2005) (collecting cases). These decisions operate under traditional defamation law principles, but the context of the online forum can influence the analysis.

(b) For example, in John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005), the court addressed alleged defamatory statements made by a blogger. In concluding that the statements were not actionable defamation, the court gave significant weight to the blog context. It held the statements were opinion and noted that, “[g]iven the context of the statement and the normally (and inherently) unreliable nature of assertions posted in chat rooms and on blogs, this is the only supportable conclusion.” Id. at 467.

(c) Likewise, in addressing a claim of defamation, the court in SPX Corp. v Doe, 253 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Ohio 2003), considered the online context of where the allegedly defamatory statements were made. It held that statements were privileged as opinion where the words used lacked precise meaning and were posted on a Web site where figurative language and hyperbole were commonplace.

(c) Conversely, in Condit v. Dunn, 317 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), the court considered a statement within an online gossip column that “Gary Condit rides with the Hell’s Angels as a motorcyclist.” The court held that while the statement was not necessarily defamatory in itself, it became potentially defamatory when coupled with the defendant’s allegations that Condit’s Hell’s Angels connection led to his criminal involvement with the disappearance of a young woman.

3. The Communications Decency Act May Grant Potential Protection to Bloggers.

(a) The Communications Decency Act (CDA) grants protection to ISPs from defamatory statements posted on sites hosted by the ISP. 47 U.S.C. § 230.

(b) Some commentators have argued that this protection should extend to the ‘comment’ sections of blogs that provide for comments by members of the public. See, e.g., Amanda Groover Hyland, “Bullied Bloggers: Why Bloggers are More Susceptible to Libel Threats,” 1 Fla. Ent. L. Rev 72-99 (2006).

(c) These commentators believe that blog public comment sections would likely fall under the CDA’s § 230(c) definition of a provider of an ‘interactive computer service.’ Id. at 93.

(d) Courts are also trending in the direction of giving Section 230 broad application. Thus, it is not out of the question that a court would conclude that blogs containing such comment sections would be protected. For example, in Universal Communication Systems, Inc. v. Zwebner, 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007), an opinion issued in February of this year, the court held that Section 230 protected the operator of an internet website that provided a forum for users to comment on the public company of their choice. The court rejected the argument that Section 230 applied only to ISPs and not to website operators. In doing so, it joined with other courts and observed that “Section 230 immunity should be broadly construed.” Id. at 419. See also Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (construing Section 230 broadly to effectuate Congress’ choice not to deter speech by imposing liability on companies that serve merely as intermediaries).

(e) Website operators have noticed the trend. For example, as of the date of this outline the online legal rating service http://www.lawyerratingz.com/ contained a section observing that potentially defamatory statements about lawyers posted on the site by anonymous clients would be protected by the CDA.

4. The Problem of Anonymity.

(a) A recurring issue is the extent to which a blogger or other online commentator may retain his or her anonymity. In this regard, courts have wrestled with balancing First Amendment protections against the right of defamation plaintiffs to protect their reputations. See generally Note, Charles B. Vincent, “Cybersmear II: Blogging and the Corporate Rematch Against John Doe Version 2.006,” 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 987 (2006) (discussing the standards used by courts when parties seek to discover the identity of anonymous bloggers).

(b) In John Doe 1 v Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005), a blogger anonymously posted allegedly defamatory statements about Cahill, a city councilor. The blogger then filed suit to prevent Cahill from discovering the blogger’s identity from the ISP. The court recognized the need to balance the right to post anonymously with the right to protect one’s reputation. It held that the defamation plaintiff must “introduce evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact for all elements of a defamation claim within the plaintiff’s control.” Id. at 463 (emphasis in original). The court adopted what has been called a “summary judgment” standard, requiring the plaintiff to survive a summary judgment analysis in order to gain access to the identity of the anonymous blogger. Id. at 460-65. But see McMann v. Doe, 460 F. Supp. 2d 259 (D. Mass. 2006) (analyzing problems inherent in the summary judgment standard in the defamation context).

(c) The New Jersey state court case of Dendrite International, Inc. v John Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. 2001), addressed similar issues. There, an anonymous person posting under the pseudonym “xxplrr” published comments on the Yahoo! Message board questioning Dendrite revenue accounting practices, marketing strategies and its value to its investors. Like the court in Cahill, the Dendrite court held that there must be a balancing act between the First Amendment rights of anonymous speech against the strength of the plaintiff’s case and the necessity for the disclosure of the identity. It also employed the summary judgment standard.

(d) In America Online, Inc., v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 261 Va. 350, 542 S.E.2d 377 (2001), the Supreme Court of Virginia dealt with the issue of compelling disclosure of an anonymous critic’s identity but employed a different standard than the courts in Cahill and Dendrite. There, the party sought to discover the identities of five John Does who had allegedly published defamatory material and misrepresentations in an online chatroom. The court rejected the summary judgment standard and instead decided that the John Does’ identity could be discovered if (i) the pleadings conveyed a good faith basis to contend that the plaintiff may be the victim of conduct actionable in the jurisdiction where the suit was filed, and (ii) the subpoenaed identity information is centrally needed to advance that claim. In that case the court found there was a good faith basis, and the motion to quash the subpoena was denied.

(e) Parties involved in efforts to discover the identity of anonymous bloggers may also face procedural hurdles.

(f) In a recent decision, one federal court found that it did not have jurisdiction in a case involving an anonymous defendant where jurisdiction was based solely on diversity (since the anonymous defendant could be domiciled in the same state as the plaintiff). McMann v. Doe, 460 F. Supp. 2d 259 (D. Mass. 2006).

(f) In yet another decision raising a procedural barrier, this time to the anonymous parties seeking to avoid discovery, the court in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Doe, 138 Cal. App. 4th 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), held that known parties do not have standing to assert defenses to discovery on behalf of anonymous third parties, at least where there is not a contractual nexus between them (such as there would be, for example, between AOL and its members).

B. Are Bloggers Entitled to Traditional Journalist Privileges?

1. Traditional Federal Law.

(a) The status of the “reporter’s privilege,” a qualified privilege permitting journalists to protect confidential sources, is uncertain even in its application to traditional journalists. While Branzburg v Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) arguably established a qualified privilege for journalists, the Supreme Court has not specifically dealt with the issue in many years and refused to grant certiorari in the Judith Miller case. See generally New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

(b) The Fourth Circuit has recognized that ‘there are First Amendment interests in newsgathering,’ but they are highly qualified interests. Food Lion, Inc v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (1999). See also In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850 (4th Cir.1992).

(c) Those courts to address the issue have generally recognized a balancing test, which includes an assessment of whether the information is highly relevant, is critical to the claim, and is unavailable from other sources. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457.

(d) As yet, there is no definitive ruling on whether this limited journalist privilege extends to information published in blogs, although the Federal Election Commission has issued an opinion bringing bloggers into the fold with traditional journalists. See Federal Election Commission, Advisory Opinion 2005-16 (Nov. 18, 2005).

(e) Moreover, the ink spilled on the issue in academic circles is impressive, with the weight of the commentary in favor of the expansion. See Randall D. Eliason, “Leakers, Bloggers, and Fourth Estate Inmates: The Misguided Pursuit of a Reporter’s Privilege,” 24 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 385 (2006-07); Anne Flanagan, “Blogging: A Journal Need Not a Journalist Make,” 16 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 395 (2005-06); Note, Stephanie J. Frazee, “Bloggers as Reporters: An Effect-Based Approach to First Amendment Protections in a New Age of Information Dissemination,” 8 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 609 (2005-06); Note, Joseph S. Alonzo, “Restoring the Ideal Marketplace: How Recognizing Bloggers As Journalists Can Save the Press,” 9 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Policy 751 (2006); Comment, Nathan Fennessy, “Bringing Bloggers Into the Journalistic Privilege Fold, 55 Catholic U. L. Rev. 1059 (2005-06); iBrief, Laura Durity, “Shielding Journalist-‘Bloggers’: The Need to Protect Newsgathering Despite the Distribution Medium,” 2006 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. No. 11.

(f) The California Court of Appeals also recently addressed the issue in O'Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). In that case, Apple Computer filed suit against unnamed individuals alleging that they leaked confidential trade secret information to online journalists about several new Apple products. Apple then sought to issue subpoenas to the online journalists to discover the sources of the leaked information. The online journalists sought a protective order barring Apple from discovering the information. The trial court denied the motion for a protective order. The court of appeals, however, reversed. In doing so, it referred to several protections afforded traditional journalists, including the California reporter’s shield law and the conditional constitutional privilege against compulsory disclosure of confidential sources. See also Case Comment, Matthew Bloom, “Subpoenaed Sources and the Internet: A Test for When Bloggers Should Reveal Who Misappropriated a Trade Secret (Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1-04-CV-032178 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2005)),” 24 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 471 (2006).

(g) The decision in O’Grady, however, will likely have little persuasive effect in Virginia since, unlike California and other states, Virginia has no ‘shield’ law indemnifying journalists from contempt proceedings for refusal to reveal confidential sources.



IV. EMPLOYMENT LAW AND BLOGGING

1. General Rules

(a) Courts have held that the ‘at-will’ employment doctrine applies to bloggers; thus, they can be terminated for anything published on a blog. See generally Stephen D. Lichtenstein and Jonathan J. Darrow, “Employment Termination for Employee Blogging: Number One Tech Trend for 2005 and Beyond, Or a Recipe for Getting Dooced,” 2006 UCLA J.L. & Tech. 4 (hereinafter “Lichtenstein and Darrow”).

(b) Examples of employees terminated for information featured on a blog include Ellen Simonetti, who wrote a “fictionalized” account of her life as a flight attendant. Even though she did not specifically mention her real-life airline employer by name, she was terminated by Delta for posting “inappropriate” pictures of herself in her Delta uniform. Henry Hoang Pham, “Bloggers and the Workplace: The Search for a Legal Solution to the Conflict Between Employee Blogging and Employers,” 26 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev 2122, 2127 (2005-2006).

(c) Michael Hanscom is another example. While going to work at Microsoft’s printshop, Hanscom noticed a shipment of Apple computers being delivered to a Microsoft loading dock. Hanscom took a picture and posted it on his daily personal blog. Microsoft discovered the post and terminated him, stating among other things that the post violated Hanscom’s duty of loyalty to the company. Konrad Lee, “Anti-Employer Blogging: Employee Breach of the Duty of Loyalty and the Procedure for Allowing Discovery of a Blogger’s Identity Before Service of Process is Effected,” 2006 Duke Law and Technology, No. 2.

(d) One potential exception to the at-will employment relationship that may be relevant to bloggers is the whistle blowing exception, where a blogger uses the blog to expose fraudulent company activities. See Lichtenstein and Darrow. In addition, some commentators have suggested that blogging directed at union organizing may be protected.

(e) Employers may also face liability if they access an employee’s blog where the employee has taken efforts to secure access to the blog. Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) (which is, in effect, an anti-wiretapping act), an employer could be in violation if it intercepted blog transmissions. Courts to address this issue, however, have read the coverage of the Act relatively narrowly. See Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006); Konop v. Hawaiian Air Lines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).

(f) Given these issues, commentators suggest that employers consider including references to blogging in company handbooks and policies and procedures, reminding employees that anything published online may be the subject of employer scrutiny.

2. Employer Liability for Employee Blogging.

(a) Employers may also face liability for content found on an employee’s blog.

(b) In Blakey v Continental Airlines 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000), derogatory and insulting remarks about Captain Tammy Blakey were posted on a company online ‘Crew Members Forum.’ Continental did nothing to remove the comments or reprimand the pilots who posted them. The court held that even though the electronic bulletin board was located outside the workplace it did not eliminate Continental’s legal obligation to correct the off-site harassment by co-employees. Id. at 549.

(e) In a highly unusual situation involving liability potentially arising out of an employee’s online commentary, a July 12, 2007, Reuters story discussed a Federal Trade Commission antitrust suit aimed at blocking Whole Foods’ planned $565 million acquisition of Wild Oats. See Peter Kaplan, John Mackey Panned Wild Oats on Web, Reuters, July 12, 2007. In the lawsuit, it was revealed that the CEO of Whole Foods, John Mackey, had posted messages on a Yahoo! Financial forum under the user name “rahodeb” talking up his own company and predicting a bleak future for Wild Oats. Id. Mackey began posting such comments as early as 1999. Interestingly, Mackey responded to the FTC on his personal blog, accusing the government agency of distorting his private statements in order to portray him as bent on destroying healthy competition. Id.

V. CONCLUSION

The potential legal issues arising out of blogs and blogging are too numerous to cover comprehensively in a single CLE outline. In many cases, one can find guidance to questions not addressed herein by looking to traditional analyses used by courts in assessing legal questions that arise outside the online world. Such frameworks provide a starting point, and rough guide, for the practitioner. Blogs, however, are a world all their own, and the law addressing them continues to evolve.




* R. Johan Conrod, Jr. practices in the commercial litigation section of Kaufman & Canoles, P.C., where he focuses on, among other areas, First Amendment and media law. After graduating from the University of Virginia School of Law in 2001, he clerked for the Hon. B. Waugh Crigler in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. He is the author of “Linking Public Websites to the Public Forum,” 87 Va. L. Rev. 1007 (Spring 2001). The author wishes to thank Bronwen Joyner, a New Zealand lawyer (and longtime blogger) currently working as a paralegal with Kaufman & Canoles, for her significant contributions to this outline.
[1] The court also considered where the defendant’s use of the mark was a ‘parody.’